HIV AIDS Resource Guide/HIV-AIDS Resource Guide.iso/STAT/CASES/STENGER.ASC

Text File | 1993-01-14 | 28KB | 566 lines

/* This case is reported in 609 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1992). This
contaminated blood case considers whether a litigant may be
permitted to interview the person who donated the contaminated
blood to see if proper procedures were followed-- and a court
permitting such discovery. The cases concerning this question
have had many different results, this one, relatively favorable.
*/

William R. Stenger, Donna A. Stenger, Craig Stenger and Barry
Stenger, Appellees,

v.

Lehigh Valley Hospital Center, Samuel Huston, Theodore J.
Matulewicz, M.D., Barry H. Slaven, M.D., Hospital Central
Services, Inc., H.C.S.C. -- Blood Center trading as Samuel W.
Miller Memorial Blood Center, Lyndal Molthan, M.D., and Joseph
Yelo.

Appeal of H.C.S.C. -- Blood Center t/a Samuel W. Miller Memorial
Blood Center, Lyndal Molthan, M.D., Joseph Yelo and Lehigh Valley
Hospital Center, Appellants.



Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Dec. 4, 1990.

Decided June 2, 1992.

/* Note that it took 18 months for the Court to rule. */



OPINION

NIX, Chief Justice.

Instantly before the Court are companion appeals from an order of
the Superior Court which had reversed in part and affirmed in
part the order of the Court of Common Pleas.  386 Pa.Super. 574,
563 A.2d 531. The appeal filed at No. 84 E.D. Appeal Docket 1990
was instituted by the Lehigh Valley Hospital Center (herein
referred to as "Hospital").  The companion appeal filed at No. 83
E.D. Appeal Docket 1990 was instituted by H.C.S.C.-Blood Center
t/a Miller Memorial Blood Center (herein referred to as "Blood
Center"). The controversy centers upon the propriety of certain
interrogatories propounded by the appellees (plaintiffs below) to
the appellants herein (defendants below).  For the reasons that
follow, we conclude that the discovery ordered by the Superior
Court is permissible under both the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure and the right to privacy guaranteed by our State and
Federal Constitutions.

The Stengers, appellees herein, brought the underlying action
asserting that the appellants were negligent in the collection
and dispensing of blood and blood products and as a result the
Stengers sustained serious injury and death. In a pretrial
application the Stengers filed a motion to the discovery of
information they felt to be crucial to the prosecution of their
claim. The instant appeal focuses upon the information sought in
interrogatories No. 28 (footnote 1) and No. 8.(footnote 2)

The facts as pleaded by the Stengers are as follows. (footnote 3)
In October of 1984, Donna Stenger was severely injured in an
automobile accident. She was taken to the Hospital where she
received multiple transfusions of blood and blood products
supplied in part by the Blood Center. In August of 1985, more
than eight months after Donna Stenger had been released from the
Hospital, the Blood Center learned that a donor who had supplied
blood used for Donna Stenger's transfusion tested positive for
the Acquired Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) virus.  However, the
Blood Center waited ten months, until May 1986, before informing
the Hospital of the possible contamination of Donna Stenger's
blood products. In November 1986, Donna Stenger was suffering
from respiratory ailments.  It was upon this visit that the
Hospital diagnosed Donna Stenger as suffering from AIDS virus,
and notified her that she had received AIDS contaminated blood
during her October 1984 treatment.  Within  two months Donna's
husband, William Stenger, and six-year old son, Craig Stenger,
were diagnosed as having been infected with the AIDS virus.  As a
result of a "look-back procedure", [footnote 4] it was learned
that an AIDS infected donor gave the infected blood which was
transfused into Donna Stenger. On July 3, 1988, Donna Stenger
died as a result of complications from the AIDS virus. [footnote
5]

The Stengers, plaintiffs below, sought to depose the donor as to
the nature of the screening process employed by the Blood Center
before extracting the blood used to transfuse Donna Stenger. The
purpose advanced was to determine the care taken by the Blood
Center in performing its functions of extracting and distributing
blood. The Stengers also sought to determine whether the Blood
Center had delivered on any other occasion blood or blood
products from the same donor to the Hospital Center. If such
blood or blood products were in fact received, the Stengers
sought the date of receipt of those products.  Additionally, they
sought whether and when those blood or blood products were
transferred to any other patients, and if so, whether those
patients have been tested for AIDS and the results of those
tests. When the Hospital refused to comply with these requests,
the Stengers filed motions to compel discovery and for sanctions.

The Hospital and the Blood Center did not object to the relevance
or materiality of the material sought; rather, they contended
that the information was not discoverable pursuant to subsections
(b) and (c) of Rule 4011 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure. [footnote 6] The trial court ruled that the Hospital
must disclose the dates of delivery of blood from the Blood
Center and must disclose the AIDS test results of patients if
there are any who also received blood from the same donor.  That
court denied the Stengers any access to the donor or donors who
supplied the blood ultimately used to transfuse Donna Stenger;
the trial court also refused to allow disclosure of the identity
of other individuals who may have received transfusions from the
same donor.

Reviewing the trial court's order, the Superior Court reversed
the trial court's order that the Stengers could not discover the
Donor's identity, concluding that a limited discovery from the
donor whose identity was protected would not constitute an
impermissible violation of the donor's right to privacy and also
would not violate the physician-patient privilege.  Additionally,
the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's ruling allowing the
Stengers to discover the dates of shipments of the donor's blood
and the results of blood tests performed on recipients of the
donor's blood. However, the Superior Court sustained the ruling
of the trial court refusing to order disclosure of the identities
of the other recipients of the blood of the donor.

The issues raised in this case are matters of first impression
and extreme importance. They are, whether a plaintiff who is
seeking damages for contracting the disease of Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome, allegedly as a result of a contaminated
blood transfusion received during her hospitalization, may,
during the discovery stage, require the defendant to produce the
donor or donors for anonymous questioning as to the screening
process employed immediately before the extraction and
circulation of the blood. Additionally, the plaintiff seeks to
obtain access to the anonymous AIDS test results of any other
recipients of the donor's blood or blood products.  For the
reasons that follow, we conclude that the plaintiff is entitled
to the protective discovery as fashioned by the Superior Court.

The parameters of discovery are delineated by Rule 4003.1 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in pertinent
part that "a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action...." Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1(a).(footnote 7) We begin
our assessment of the issues herein by noting that the relevance
of the information sought by plaintiffs is beyond question and
not disputed by the parties.

Appellant, Blood Center, argues that the limited discovery
ordered by the Superior Court is not permissible under Rule
4011(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which
limits the permissible scope of discovery, and is violative of
the donor's right to privacy under both the Pennsylvania and the
United States Constitutions.

Appellant Hospital argues that the discovery order in question
would violate the recipients' constitutional right of privacy
and, additionally, alleges that the information sought is
privileged and protected pursuant to the physician-patient
privilege, 42 Pa.C.S.  5929 ("Physicians not to disclose
information").

[1, 2]  We first address the argument raised by both appellants,
that the discovery at issue will violate the privacy rights of
the donor and the other recipients of blood from that source. As
the right of privacy is a well-settled part of the
jurisprudential tradition in this Commonwealth, we are mindful,
as ever, to avoid unjustified intrusions into the private zone of
our citizens' lives. We must hear in mind, however, that the
right is not an unqualified one; it must be balanced against
weighty competing private and state interests. Fabio v. Civil
Service Commission of City of Philadelphia, 489 Pa. 309, 414 A.2d
82 (1980).

There is no longer any question that the United States
Constitution provides protection for an individual's right of
privacy. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51
L.Ed.2d 64 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35
L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct.
1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 85 S.Ct. 1678,14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Fraternal Order of
Police, Lodge 5 v. Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105 (3d Cir.1987);
United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d
Cir.1980).  At least two distinct types of privacy interests have
been recognized. "One is the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600, 97 S.Ct at 876-877 (footnote
omitted). This Court has recognized these same interests under
the Pennsylvania Constitution. See In re June 1979 Allegheny
County  Investigating Grand Jury, 490 Pa. 143, 415 A.2d 73
(1980); In re "B", 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1979).

The right at issue herein concerns avoiding disclosure of
personal matters.  The object of such a right is, in part, to
protect an individual from revealing matters which could impugn
his character and subject hint to ridicule or persecution.  While
we respect this right, we are persuaded that this privacy
interest is not offended by the anonymous nature of the
disclosure permitted by the Superior Court.  With no name
associated with the disclosure, no disrepute can occur. The evil
unleashed by divulging A the secret of AIDS falls harmlessly into
oblivion once it hits the shield of anonymity.  Hence, this
aspect of the privacy is protected.

We would be derelict in our analysis of this issue, however, if
we failed to recognize that the aforementioned privacy interests
also subsume the right to be let alone. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980); Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d
965 (1977); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct 507, 19
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). It is the infringement of this right which fu
els the Blood Center's fear that future donations will be
hindered if post donation questioning of donors is permitted.
While the Blood Center's fears may be genuine, the constitutional
argument will not suffice to bar discovery.

The right to privacy has never been held to be absolute. Florida
Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524,109 S.Ct. 2603,105 L.Ed.2d 443
(1989);  Westinghouse, supra.  The U.S. Supreme Court has
consistently held that, while an individual's right to privacy is
fundamental, it can be abridged by certain overriding
governmental interests. (footnote 8)  Id. Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867
(1977);  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64
(1977).

The Supreme Court of the United States has applied increasing
levels of scrutiny corresponding to increasing levels of confi
dentiality intrusions.  In reviewing these standards, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated:

In addressing claimed violations of confidentiality  interests,
the  United States Supreme Court has applied a flexible balancing
approach. For example, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Ser
vices, 433 U.S. 425, 458, 97 S.Ct 2777, 2797, 53 L.Ed.2d 867
(1977), the Court stated:  "But the merit of appellant's claim of
invasion of his privacy ... must be considered in light of the
specific provisions of the Act, and any intrusion must be weighed
against the public interest in subjecting the Presidential materi
als of appellant's administration to archival screening."  Most
circuits appear to apply an "intermediate standard of review" for
the majority of confidentiality violations, see Barry v. City of
New York, 712 F.2d 1554,1559 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1017, 104 S.Ct. 548, 78 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983), with a compelling
interest analysis reserved for "severe intrusions" on
confidentiality. See Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459,
469 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979, 105 S.Ct. 380, 83
L.Ed.2d 315 (1984); see also Whalen, supra  (Brennan, J., con
curring) ("a statute that did effect such a [serious] deprivation
[of privacy] would only be consistent with the constitution if it
were necessary to promote a compelling state interest").

Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 5 v. Philadelphia, 812 F.2d
105,110 (3d Cir. 1987).  The Court of Appeals relied on
Westinghouse, supra, for the following balancing test that should
be applied when scrutinizing the privacy interest in confidential
information where there is adequate protection against
unauthorized disclosure:

[W]e must engage in the delicate task of weighing  competing
interests.   The factors which should be considered in deciding
whether an intrusion into an individual's privacy is justified
are the type of record requested, the information it does or
might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent
nonconsensual disclosure, the injury for disclosure to the
relationship in which the record was generated, the adequacy of
safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of need
for access, and whether there is an express statutory mandate,
articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest
militating toward access.

limitations. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 US. 20, 104
S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984).

Id.  (quoting United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638
F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.1980)). In Westinghouse, the court, after
balancing these competing interests, allowed  disclosure  of
medical  records, records which were deemed to fall within a zone
of privacy, upon a showing of proper government interest.
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 580.

We believe a similar showing can be made in the instant case. The
information requested is completely anonymous, there will be no
names or addresses on record associated with the questionnaire
returned by the donor or the test results from the other
recipients. There is a high degree of need for the information,
as discussed earlier, for without it, the Stengers cannot hope to
establish negligence. Finally, we believe that public policy
mandates discovery in this instance.  It is imperative to ensure
responsibility in those engaging in the business of blood
collection and dissemination.

Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the right to be let alone
has also been recognized. See Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419,
414 A.2d 318 (1980); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476
(1959). Similarly in Pennsylvania, this right is not absolute.
John M and Paula I:, 524 Pa. 306, 571 A.2d 1380 (1990);
Denoncourt v. Commonwealth, State Ethics Commission, 504 Pa. 191,
470 A.2d 945 (1983); Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d
457 (1983); In re June, 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand
Jury, supra' Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318
(1980); Vogel v. WI: Grant Ca, 458 Pa. 124, 32,1, A.2d 133
(1974).  However, Pennsylvania has not adopted a flexible
approach in its state constitutional privacy analysis. Under the
law of this Commonwealth only a compelling state interest will
override one's privacy rights. Fabio v. Civil Service Commission
of the City of Philadelphia, 489 Pa. 309, 414 A.2d 82 (1980). See
Denoncourt (Nix, J. dissenting), supra

In Fabio, this Court had occasion to consider whether dismissal
of an officer from the police force for extramarital sexual
activities was constitutionally permissible.

The officer argued, inter alia, that his dismissal violated his
constitutionally protected right of privacy. After recognizing
that the right to engage in extramarital sexual activities fell
within the zone of privacy, this Court said, "once a court finds
that an individual has a constitutionally protected right to
privacy to engage in a course of conduct, the government's
regulation limiting this right may only be justified by a
'compelling state interest'." Fabio, 489 Pa. at 323, 414 A.2d at
89 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154, 93 S.Ct. at 72"'). In
finding that "the government has a compelling state interest in
the maintenance of public respect for police officers" we said,
"when an employee's private life is the center of rumors, when it
adversely affects his fellow workers, when it corrupts his family
members, and when it results in complaints to his employer,
governmental intervention is warranted." Id. 489 Pa. at 324-25,
414 A.2d at 90.

In this case, the state's interest in the preservation of the
integrity of our volunteer blood donations is compelling. We
believe that the concern for protection of the quality of blood
is at least equal to, if not more important than, the concern for
protecting its quantity.  Every year countless numbers of our
citizens need blood transfusions for emergency and elective
medical procedures.  We cannot insulate collecting agencies from
the weighty responsibilities incumbent upon them.  Allowing AIDS
contaminated blood into the system may result in horrific,
incalculable harm. Hence, the state's interest in allaying these
concerns and restoring the integrity of the blood supply is a
compelling one. This limited discovery order will foster
society's interest in ensuring institutional accountability while
preserving the privacy of those individuals who generously donate
their blood.

Whether or not a given state interest justifies such an intrusion
depends, in part' "on whether the state's intrusion will effect
its purpose; for if the intrusion does not effect the state's
purpose, it is a gratuitous intrusion, not a purposeful one."
Denoncourt, 504 Pa. at 200, 470 A.2d at 949. We believe that an
anonymous discovery is the least intrusive method available to
us, under the facts of this case, to protect the public interest.
(footnote 9)  Consequently the intrusion will not be gratuitous,
but rather, purposeful, see,  e.g.,  Denoncourt, supra,'
therefore, no constitutional rights will be compromised.
(footnote 10)

This result is consistent with results reached in other
jurisdictions which have concluded, in cases involving discovery
from donors of tainted blood, that the limited privacy rights of
donors must be balanced against the interests of society and the
needs of those seeking the information, and protective discovery
was allowed. See Boutte v. Blood Systems, Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122
(W.D.La.1989);  Mason v. Regional Medical Center of Hopkins
County, 121 F.R.D. 300 (W.D.Ky.1988); Belle Bonfils Memorial
Blood Center v. District Court in and for the City and County of
Denver, 763 P.2d 1003 (Colo.1988); Krygier v. Airweld,  Inc.,
137  Misc.2d  306,  520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup.Ct1187); Gulf Coast
Regional Blood Center v. Houston, 745 S.W.2d 557
(Tex.Ct.App.1988);  Tarrant County Hospital District v. Hughes,
734 S.W.2d 675 (Tex.Ct.App.1987).

[3, 4]  The foregoing discussion also responds to the Blood
Center's argument that the discovery order is impermissible under
Rule 4011(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
(footnote 11)  That rule is merely a codification of this Court's
analysis of the constitutional right to privacy and as such
provides no more protection than the constitutional right
provides.

[5]  Nor would the instant procedure be antagonistic to the
privilege created under Rule 4011(c) (footnote 12) because of its
anonymous nature. The privilege asserted here by the hospital is
the patient-physician privilege which provides that "no physician
shall be allowed, in any civil matter, to disclose any
information which he acquired in attending the patient in a
professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity, which shall tend to blacken the character
of the patient.  42 Pa. C.S.  5929.  As this Court pointed out in
1n re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 490
Pa. 143, 415 A.2d 73 (1980), Pennsylvania law distinguishes
between information communicated to a physician by a patient and
information acquired through examination and observation.  In
Allegheny County, we held that the patient-physician "privilege
is limited to information which would offend the rationale of the
privilege, i.e., information directly related to the patient's
communication and thus tending to expose it." Id. at 14950, 415
A.2d at 77.

We agree with the trial court's conclusion that, "[v]iewing the
requested information with this principle in mind, we believe
that only the identity of the recipients could potentially be
subjected to the privilege." Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hospital
Center, et al, No. 87 586, slip op. at 9 (Court of Common Pleas
of Lehigh County, April 22, 1988) (emphasis added).

With regard to the test results of the other recipients of the
blood, the test, as mentioned above, is whether a disclosure
might blacken the character of the patient. The confidentiality
ordered by the Superior Court will prevent this sensitive informa
tion from reaching the public.  Thus the reputation and character
of any recipient who contracted AIDS will remain insulated from
public view.  Moreover, despite the appellants' assertions to the
contrary, we are confident that the mechanisms which will prevent
the disclosure of this information will operate throughout the
entire proceeding so that the information will remain
confidential. The assurance of anonymity will also diffuse the
argument that the blood supply would be significantly impaired by
an exodus of potential donors fearing involvement in future
litigation. (footnote 13) Thus, we reject the contention of the
Blood Center that such inquiries would be detrimental to the
maintenance of an adequate blood supply.

Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court's order granting
limited discovery from the donor and granting the request for
disclosure of the results of tests performed on other recipients
of the blood or blood products of the donor and refusing to
disclose the identities of the donor or the other recipients of
the donor's blood or blood products.







FOOTNOTES



1.   Interrogatory number 28 addressed to the Hospital, requested
the following information:

State whether Lehigh Valley Hospital Center has received any
other blood and/or blood products from the Miller Memorial Blood
Center which was or may have been contaminated with the AIDS
virus. If the answer is yes, state:

a)   the date(s) on which such blood was delivered to Lehigh
Valley Hospital Center;

b)   whether such blood and/or blood products were ever
administered to any person through transfusion or otherwise;

c)   identify the individual(s) who received the blood and/or
blood products identified in subparagraph (b);

d)   identify whether the individual(s) referred to in
interrogatory 28(c) has been tested for AIDS;

e)   state with' particularity the results of each such test.



2. Interrogatory number 8 addressed to the Blood Center,
requested the following:



Identify the name and last known address of the donor(s) who
supplied the blood ultimately used to transfuse Donna Stenger.



3.   The material facts of this case upon which the alleged
liability is premised have been denied by the appellants. If this
matter reaches the trial stage, the duty to prove those facts
will of course be upon the appellees. At this stage the well-
pleaded facts will be assumed to be true. See, e.g., Congini by
Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515
(1983); Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141. 470 A.2d 507 (1983);
Gekas v. Shapp, 3, 469 Pa. 1, 364 A.2d 691 (1976);  Borden v.
Baldwin, 444 Pa. 577, 281 A.2d 892 (1971).

4.   "Look-back procedure" was described by the Blood Center as
follows:

Under the "look-back procedure" when a donor tests positive for
exposure to the AIDS antibody. it is then determined whether he
has made prior donations. If prior donations were made the
recipients of the blood products from prior donations are
contacted so that they may be tested.

Blood Center's Brief at p. 7.

5.   On September 28, 1988. William Stenger, as Administrator for
the estate of Donna Stenger, filed in the Court of Common Pleas
of Lehigh County a suggestion of death and praecipe for the
substitution of the estate as a plaintiff in this case.

6.   Rule 4011 sets forth the following limitations: RULE 4011.
LIMITATION OF SCOPE OF DISCOVERY AND DEPOSITION No discovery or
deposition shall be permitted which

(b)  would cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment.
oppression, burden or expense to the deponent or any person or
party;

(c)  [or] relates to matter which is privileged. . -.

Pa.R.C.P. 4011.

7.   Rule 4003.1. Scope of Discovery Generally (a) Subject to the
provisions of Rules 4003.2 to 4003.5 inclusive and Rule 4011, a
party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, content, custody,
condition and location  of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of any discoverable matter.

(b)  It is not ground for objection that the information sought
will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

Adopted Nov. 20. 1978. effective Jan. 1. 1990.

8.   It is acknowledged that court orders which compel, restrict
or prohibit discovery constitute state action which Is subject to
constitutional

9.   It is important to note that on May 20, 1991, the American
Red Cross, our nation's leading blood collection agency,
announced wide-ranging changes in its blood screening and testing
procedures. See, eg.. Red Cross Orders Sweeping Changes at Blood
Centers, New York Times, May 20, 1991, at A 1. col. 3.

10.  In November, 1990, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the
Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information Act ("Act") which,
inter alia, prohibits the dissemination of AIDS records except
where a compelling need exists, which cannot be accommodated by
other means. While this Act was not in effect at the time this
lawsuit was instituted and was not considered by the lower
courts, we believe our decision today reflects the policies
expressed by the legislature. See 35 P.S.  7007(a)(10),
7608(a)(l), (c), (f), (h).

11.  See n. 6 supra for text of rule.

12.  See n. 6 supra for text of rule.

13.  See p. 801 supra for the discussion of the anonymous nature
of the discovery.